Chapter 3

Taking Mount Matsuo

Once the ninth month had begun, the Kobayakawa forces moved out as far as Takamiya in Omi and set up camp there. Taking no part in the Western Army's operations and making no move to join Ieyasu's army, they remained at Takamiya. That Ieyasu had left Edo and was coming west along the Tokaido road was known in the Western camps too, and it was to hold the road from Mino into Omi that Otani Yoshitsugu had taken up his position at Yamanaka.

What Hideaki was waiting for was word that Ieyasu had left Kiyosu in Owari. If he waited to hear that Ieyasu had crossed into Mino before setting out, then by the time Ieyasu appeared before Ogaki, his own men would still be on the road from Takamiya to Mount Matsuo. Yet if he went up the mountain on his own authority while Ieyasu was still far off, Kobayakawa's 8,000 men alone would fall under suspicion and be cut off in the middle of the Western Army.

At Hideaki's side were his senior retainers, Inaba Masanari and Hiraoka Yorikatsu.

"Are we to do nothing?" said Inaba.

"I am doing something. I'm waiting."

"The scouts say no large force has gone onto the mountain yet. If we take it now, no one can get there ahead of us."

"And if we take it and Ieyasu doesn't come?"

Inaba fell silent.

"Once we've taken the mountain, we can't go back to not having taken it."

"But if we let the days pass, some other force may go in."

"If they do, I'll think of something else then. Act suspiciously with no allies nearby, and you risk being surrounded by enemies on every side. If you call that courage, then I'm content to

Analysis I-6 How Mitsunari Responds, with Mount Matsuo Taken (Chapter 4)

Key point

Once Hideaki had taken Mount Matsuo, every response open to Mitsunari carried a cost.

On the 14th day of the 9th month, the 8,000 men of the Kobayakawa forces had moved onto the high ground behind Mitsunari at Ogaki Castle. If he stayed at Ogaki and only kept watch, he would be fighting Ieyasu with a large army left at his back. If he attacked the Kobayakawa, he would be attacking, on the sole authority of a commissioner, an allied daimyo who had not yet declared his defection. The supreme commander, Terumoto, was in Osaka, and Mitsunari could not make that decision alone (this book's assumption). Even if he wanted the Mori forces to hold the Kobayakawa in check, there were no grounds for turning Mori troops on the Kobayakawa, a branch of the Mori family. If he moved his main force toward Sekigahara and held the Kobayakawa in check together with the forces in Otani's sector, he could preserve his main force, protect his line of retreat to Omi, and also be prepared for a decisive battle with Ieyasu. What is more, he would not need to declare the Kobayakawa an enemy there and then. This book infers that Mitsunari chose this response and instructed Otani to move his camp at Yamanaka forward to a position directly facing Mount Matsuo. What Hideaki created was a situation in which every response open to Mitsunari carried a cost; he did not predict which response Mitsunari would choose.

In game theory

Even if the opponent responds rationally, one can first create a situation in which he finds it hard to choose responses unfavorable to one's own side. Under this book's assumptions, Mitsunari's response is a rational response within constraints. From this night until the morning of the decisive battle, no player can observe all of the other side's actions (imperfect information). Each time an observable action with a high reversal cost occurs, such as the move onto Mount Matsuo, the march out of Ogaki, or the advance into the basin, the other players revise their expectations about the other side's intentions.

Structure of the decision

Players	Mitsunari, facing Hideaki on Mount Matsuo
Game structure	A sequential game
Key concepts	Rational response under constraints, changing the strategic environment
Information held	The Kobayakawa's entry into Mount Matsuo, Hideaki's refusal of the invitation to Ogaki, the information that he is in secret contact with Ieyasu, and the arrival of Ieyasu's own army at Akasaka (that Mitsunari knew the last of these on that night is this book's assumption)
Uncertainty	Whether Hideaki is in secret contact with Ieyasu (imperfect information). Under what conditions Hideaki would choose Ieyasu's side (incomplete information)
Objective	To preserve the Western Army's main force, protect the line of retreat to Omi, and prepare for a decisive battle with Ieyasu

Comparison of options

1 The main force stays at Ogaki, and the Kobayakawa are only watched

Advantage

- He need not move his troops, and can make use of the defensive strength of Ogaki Castle

Cost and risk

- He would be fighting Ieyasu with the 8,000 men of the Kobayakawa forces left on the high ground on his flank and rear.
- If Ieyasu passes Ogaki and goes west, he cannot stop him.
- It would leave Otani isolated at Yamanaka and put the line of retreat to Omi at risk as well.

2 The main force stays at Ogaki, and the Mori forces are sent ahead to Sekigahara to hold the Kobayakawa in check

Advantage

- He can strengthen the defense of the Sekigahara front without moving his main force

Cost and risk

- There are no grounds that would justify ordering the Mori forces to hold the Kobayakawa forces, a branch of their own family, in check.
- They would be led by Hidemoto, not by Terumoto himself, and would be hard to move without the agreement of Kikkawa Hiroie and others in the Mori house.

3 The main force stays at Ogaki, and part of his troops is detached to attack the Kobayakawa

Advantage

- He can remove the threat at his back first

Cost and risk

- He would be attacking, on the sole authority of a commissioner, an allied daimyo who had not yet declared his defection.
- The detached troops reduce the force he can turn on Ieyasu.

Evidence C

Sources, Tradition, and Fiction

This book is a work of fiction, but readers need to be able to tell how much of it is based on the sources, where interpretation begins, and where outright fiction begins. Evidence C is a list compiled for that purpose, and it also names the main works this book has drawn on.

Evidence C-1 How the Sources Are Handled

Where Sekigahara is concerned, statements with very different degrees of certainty in the sources have often been presented as if they were equally certain. A letter written two days after the battle, a war chronicle compiled a hundred years later, and a modern information panel all look like the same "historical fact" when they are set side by side. Evidence C therefore sorts the material this book has used into the following categories.

1. **Documented**: contemporary sources. Letters, diaries and the like written at the time of the battle. Where a document survives only as a copy, that is stated.
2. **Later record**: later house genealogies and memoranda. The house genealogies and lineage records compiled by daimyo houses and the shogunate in the Edo period, and the memoranda (oboegaki) and records written down in later years by those involved or by their retainers.
3. **Later record**: war chronicles. The war chronicles (gunki) written in the Edo period.
4. **Modern research**: military histories from the Meiji period on, and the articles and books of recent scholars.
5. **Received tradition**: accounts that are widely adopted but cannot be confirmed in contemporary sources. The positions popularized from the Meiji period on by deployment maps such as the Army General Staff's belong here.
6. **The author's inference**: interpretations that are not stated as such in the sources, but that this book has drawn from circumstances that can be confirmed.
7. **Assumptions made for the analysis**: premises that this book adopted for the story and the analysis where the sources leave several alternatives open. They are not derived from evidence.
8. **Fiction**: what the text supplies because it cannot be confirmed in the sources: the characters' thoughts and lines, their exchanges with one another, and the details of scenes.

Classifying a story that appears in later house genealogies or war chronicles under "later house genealogies and memoranda" or "war chronicles" does not mean that it is "wrong." It means that the story is widely known but cannot be confirmed in contemporary sources.

Evidence C is divided by topic and presents tables on Fushimi Castle (Evidence C-2), the negotiations with the Eastern Army before the battle (Evidence C-3), Mount Matsuo (Matsuoyama) (Evidence C-4), the move from Ogaki to Sekigahara (Evidence C-5), Otani and the four units (Evidence C-6), and Mount Nangu and the Kikkawa (Evidence C-7). The author's own inferences and the assumptions made for the analysis are collected in Evidence C-8, and the outright fiction in the Story is listed in Evidence C-9. Where views are divided, both the view adopted and the one set aside are given.

These eight categories classify the material chiefly by when it was created, how it was transmitted, and what kind of document it is. The degree of certainty of any particular statement in the sources is determined by other factors, which are noted item by item: who wrote it, for whom and to what end, whether at first hand or by report, and whether the original or a copy survives.

For each item, the relevant entry or document number in the source is given on the author's site under "The Sources in Detail."

Nature of the principal sources and studies

- The copy of the jointly signed letter from Ishikawa Yasumichi and Hikosaka Motomasa dated the 17th day of the 9th month of Keicho 5 (1600) (addressed to Matsudaira Ienori; *Hori monjo* [Hori documents] no. 5, held by the Archives (Kiroku Shiryokan) attached to Kyushu University Library) is a letter written two days after the battle. It is not the original but a copy, and it bears a colophon (okugaki) by Honda Masanobu dated the 26th day of the 9th month. Recent research, beginning with Shiramine Jun's, gives it great weight as a record written by retainers on the Tokugawa side immediately after the battle. This book calls it "the copy of the jointly signed letter of the 17th day of the 9th month," and discusses Ieyasu's arrival at Akasaka in Evidence C-4, the Western Army's withdrawal from Ogaki and the time of the main battle in Evidence C-5, and the daimyo who switched sides and the commanders who were killed in Evidence C-6.
- The letter from Tokugawa Ieyasu to Date Masamune dated the 15th day of the 9th month of Keicho 5 (October 21, 1600) was written by Ieyasu himself on the day of the battle, and records the place-name of the battlefield (Evidence C-5).
- The memorandum (oboegaki) of Miyanohara Saibei, a retainer of Shimazu Tadatoyo (colophon dated Kanbun 3); the memorandum of Inoue Shuzen (colophon dated Meireki 3) and a memorandum by another retainer (colophon dated Kanbun 4), both of the Shimazu house; and the later account by Mizuno Katsunari, who was with the Eastern Army, which report on Ogaki on the night of the 14th day of the 9th month, are all later memoranda written by particip-